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New York Managed Care Legislation: A
Substantive Response to Corporate Medicine




A healthy forty-seven year old man was diagnosed with a rare disease
called AL amyloidosis, which shuts down the functions of the person's or-
gans. Despite the recommendations of four physicians to conduct a bone
marrow transplant, the patient's HMO refused to pay $150,000 for the
transplant, saying that the treatment was "investigational." The man
subsequently died.'
A seven and one-half year old boy with cystic fibrosis developed a painful
bowel obstruction. His HMO mandated a cheaper, generic medication to
treat the obstruction, even though it was not as effective as the more ex-
pensive brand-name drug that his physician recommended. The boy suf-
fered the obstruction under hospital care while waiting for the HMO to
review its decision.2
A patient discovered a lump in his thigh, which was later diagnosed as
sarcoma-a form of cancer. He underwent chemotherapy, but the treat-
ment was not successful and the cancer spread to the patient's lungs.
The patient's HMO refused to pay for further treatment, stating that it
offered him little or no hope. The HMO's refusal came despite the fact
that the surgeon offered to perform the procedure free-of-charge.
3
The times are changing in the practice of medicine. This is
perhaps best illustrated by the recent shift towards managed
care. With lower monthly premiums, millions of people trans-
t J.D. candidate, May 1998, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. Tom Precious, Battle Under Way to Make State HMOs Liable on Care, BUFF.
NEws, July 27, 1997, at Al.
2. Henry L. Davis, State's Managed Care Safeguards Take Effect, BuFF. NEws, Apr.
1, 1997, at Al.
3. Harold Brown, The Impact of HMO Capitation on Health Law, MAss. LAws.'
WELY., Mar. 17, 1997, at 11.
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ferred their insurance from traditional indemnity plans to man-
aged care. Today, approximately seventy-three percent of U.S.
workers with health insurance receive coverage from a managed
care organization (MCO).4 This increased from fifty-one percent
in 1995. 5
However, as managed care proliferates, the popular percep-
tion of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) diminishes.
The media regularly publish anecdotes (such as above) where
HMOs deny health care services or payment to enrollees. 6 Sto-
ries of soaring HMO profits and multimillion dollar executive
schemes fuel further discontent with managed care.7
In addition, critics of managed care claim that MCOs have
essentially "corporatized" the health care system, dehumanizing
the doctor-patient relationship, making it into a business rather
than a personal interaction.8 As managed care grows, and the
general population becomes more familiar with its cost-cutting
mechanisms, members are increasingly questioning whether
managed care ignores the patient's best interests in favor of
higher corporate profits.9
As a result, almost every state legislature in 1996 proposed
HMO regulation, with over one thousand bills being intro-
duced. 10 Proposals were passed in forty states, often with bipar-
4. See Gail Jenson et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends
in the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 125-26.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part III; David Moran, Federal Regulation of Managed Care, HEALTH
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 7, 9.
7. See Walter Zellman, Consumer Protection in Managed Care: Finding the Balance,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 158-59. See e.g. Milt Freudenheim, Penny-Pinching
HMOs Showed Their Generosity in Executive Paychecks, N.Y. Tims, Apr. 11, 1995, at D4;
Milt Freudenheim, Top Salaries at Big HMOs Averaged $7 Million in 1994, LA DAILY
NEws, Apr. 11, 1995, at B3.
8. See generally MARc RODwIN, MoNEY, MEDICINE, AND MoRALs 1-8 (1993) (discussing
how physicians have become more detached from their patients because of the change in
the medical practice over the last century). The American Medical Association launched
an anti-managed-care campaign regarding the corporatization of health care. One ad
warned, 'Would you rather trust your life to an M.D. or an M.B.A.?" In a newspaper ar-
ticle, an AMA official warned, "If we don't keep the health care plans honest, some anon-
ymous clerk sitting at the end of a 1-800 number is going to take over for your doctor."
Bruce Platt & Lisa Stream, Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis
of Anti-Managed Care Legislation and the Quality of Care Provided by Health Mainte-
nance Organizations, 23 FLA ST. U.L. REv. 489, 496 n.62 (1995).
9. See generally RODWIN, supra note 8.
10. See Families USA, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the Rescue (last modified
July 1996) <http//epn.org/families/farisk.html> (spot:introduction) (on file with author
and the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter Consumers at Risk-July].
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tisan support.' President Clinton also assembled a commission
to study the possibility of passing similar legislation on the fed-
eral level. In November 1997, the commission issued a proposed
"Patient's Bill of Rights," which essentially mirrors various state
enactments. 12 As of this writing, the U.S. Congress is consider-
ing the commission's recommendations. 13
This Comment will evaluate managed care regulation in the
context of today's health care system, and consider whether
state involvement will substantially affect how MCOs deliver
health care services. In light of increased competition and inte-
grated services in the health care field, this Comment concludes
that managed care regulation will have only a minimal (if any)
impact upon the delivery of services.
Parts I and II provide a basic overview of managed care,
and identify several consumer concerns. Parts III and IV discuss
the public and legislative "backlash" against managed care, and
offer a detailed look at the provisions of the New York Health
Care Consumer Protection Act, which is considered to be among
"the strongest managed care consumer protection[s] [Acts] in the
nation." 4 Finally, this Comment will evaluate the effectiveness
of managed care regulation in today's health care system and
propose several remedies to ensure that health care providers do
not overlook consumer concerns.
I. WHAT IS MANAGED CARE?
Managed care is a type of health care delivery system
where "an attempt is made to control costs by controlling the
provision of services."'5 There are three basic types of MCOs,
11. See Families USA, Update: HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the Rescue (last
modified August 1997) <http-J/epn.org/families/farisk.html> (spot:introduction) (on file
with author and the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter Consumers at Risk-August].
12. See Alissa Rubin, Panel's "Bill of Rights" Would Give Patients More Health Care
Clout, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 19, 1997, at A14.
13. See Paul Leavitt et al., Clinton Seeks Patient Rights, Cites Women's Health
Study, USA TODAY, May 28, 1998, at 11A.
14. Consumers At Risk-July, supra note 10 (spot:key findings).
15. John Iglehart, Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1167 (1994). Doctor Iglehart further explains the concept of managed care:
Managed care is a system that, in varying degrees, integrates the financing
and delivery of medical care through contracts with selected physicians and
hospitals that provide comprehensive health care services to enrolled members
for a predetermined monthly premium. All forms of managed care represent
attempts to control costs by modifying the behavior of doctors, although they
do so in different ways.
Id. In several of his articles, Professor Marc Rodwin notes that "[m]anaged care organi-
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with HMOs being the most recognizable. 16 Under a simplified
model, managed care is characterized by three fundamental
mechanisms: (1) the gatekeeper system, (2) capitation and (3)
clinical rules.
In order to control costs and the provision of services, MCOs
usually delegate responsibilities to physicians (typically primary
care physicians (PCPs)) who act as "gatekeepers" to ensure that
patients are receiving treatment in .a cost-effective manner. 7
Gatekeeping is a case management technique where services are
strategically rationed.18 The primary goal is to "keep as many
patients as possible on the primary care, outpatient level."19 Ac-
cess to more expensive specialty care is limited to only extreme
cases of "medical necessity."20 Thus, the gatekeeper is an essen-
tial component of managed care, assuring that treatment costs
are proportionate to the degree of severity of the illness. As a
gatekeeper, the PCP assumes the dual responsibilities of acting
zations exercise control over the kind, volume, and manner in which services are pro-
vided by choosing providers, or by controlling their behavior through financial incen-
tives, rules, and organizational controls." Marc Rodwin, Consumer Protection and
Managed Care: Issues, Reforms Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. Rnv. 1321, 1321
n.1 (1996) [hereinafter Issues, Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs]; Marc Rodwin, Man-
aged Care and Consumer Protection: What are the Issues?, 26 SnrON HALL L. Rav. 1007,
1009 n.1 (1996) [hereinafter What Are the Issues?].
16. The three types of MCOs include: (1) Health Maintenance Organization: an
HMO acts as an intermediary between the patient and the physician in an attempt to
control the cost and delivery of services. Members of HMOs pay a nominal monthly pre-
mium and may choose from a closed panel of providers when seeking medical care. Prov-
iders enter an HMO network by contracting with the organization and receiving an up-
front payment to treat HMO members (known as "capitation). There are two basic types
of HMOs. A Staff Model HMO owns all health care facilities and places contracting phy-
sicians on an annual salary. A Group Model or Network HMO contracts with the physi-
cian and/or Independent Practice Association (IPA); (2) Preferred-Provider Organiza-
tions: a PPO is a network of physicians who contract with an insurer to provide services
at reduced rates. In return, insurers are prohibited from referring patients to providers
outside the PPO; (3) Point-Of-Service Plans: this type of MCO is substantially similar to
an HMO, but allows the enrollee to seek treatment from providers outside its network
for an additional copayment. See Issues, Reform Proposals and Trade-Offs, supra note
15, at 1321 n.1. The HMO will primarily be discussed in this Comment.
17. See Sheva J. Sanders, Regulating Managed Care Plans Under Current Law: A
Radical Reversion to Established Doctrine, 20 HOFSTIA L. REV. 73, 80 (1991). See gener-
ally Peter Franks et al., Gatekeeping Revisited-Protecting Patients from Overtreatment,
327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 424, 425 (1992); Michael D. Reagan, Physicians as Gatekeepers,
317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1731 (1987).
18. See Reagan, supra note 16, at 1731. The term "rationing" typically means the
denial or limit of beneficial medical services out of consideration of cost. Mark Hall, Ra-
tioning Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 695 (1994).
19. Reagan, supra note 16, at 1731.
20. Deven McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians be Re-
quired to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 1823-24 (1995).
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as patient advocate and MCO agent. Often, these dual roles con-
flict and split a gatekeeper's loyalties between the patient and
MCO.21
To ensure that the gatekeeper acts in good faith to control
costs, MCOs utilize a capitation system of payment with finan-
cial incentives for physicians who most effectively manage treat-
ment costs. 22 Capitation is a method of payment whereby the
physician receives a predetermined amount of money for each
enrollee.23 In return, the physician agrees to provide all neces-
sary care to HMO patients.
For example, if the PCP agrees to receive ten dollars for
each HMO member, he or she will get ten thousand dollars after
treating one thousand members. However, this is the maximum
amount that the PCP can receive. If the costs of treating the
one thousand patients exceeds ten thousand dollars, then the
provider is responsible for the deficit and must absorb the cost.24
On the other hand, if the PCP is able to keep costs under ten
thousand dollars, he or she enjoys a profit. Thus, the provider
has an incentive to keep costs as low as possible, not only to
avoid a payment deficit, but to maximize profits, since any capi-
tation money remaining after treatment costs goes into the pro-
vider's pocket.25
To complement capitation arrangements, MCOs may create
additional financial incentives for providers to keep costs low.
The three most common types of incentives are bonuses, with-
holds, and subcapitation.26 If a physician is able to maintain an
effective case management technique, the MCO may award a bo-
nus in addition to the capitation payment.27 In many instances,
the physician relies upon the bonus for net income while using
21. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
22. Sanders, supra note 17, at 81.
23. Id.
24. Id. Attorney Harold Brown provides a second example:
[I]f the HMO's annual capitation fee for each patient is $3,000, the primary
doctor will receive a bonus for the cost of the patient's annual medical treat-
ment below $3,000. If the expense is $1,500, the doctor will obtain a fixed per-
centage share of that "saving." If the patient's annual medical treatment
reaches a higher figure, like $4,500, the entire excess over $3,000 will be
charged against the doctor's personal income.
Brown, supra note 3, at 11.
25. Id. Capitation payment structures are much more complex than described
herein. For a more detailed description of capitation, see Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin
Grumbach, Capitation or Decapitation, 276 JAMA 1025 (1996).
26. See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to
Physicians, 22 Av. J.L. & MED. 399, 403 (1996).
27. Id.
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capitation payments to pay office overhead. 28 As a result, bonus
payments are becoming increasingly significant.29
Alternatively, an MCO may withhold a percentage of its
capitation payment to account for frivolous expenses. 30 MCOs
often place withholds in a "risk pool" which are used for addi-
tional services such as laboratory or radiology tests. 31 The with-
hold is intended to act as a "buffer" to ensure that total treat-
ment costs do not exceed allocation.3 2 At the end of the year,
any funds remaining in the risk pool may be distributed to phy-
sicians in the form of a bonus 3
Subcapitation involves a fund separate from capitation
which covers the costs of referral services. 34 Like capitation,
providers are expected to maintain all referral costs below a
specified level. This shifts the risk of referrals to the physician
who is liable for any deficits, and may not receive a bonus (or
may receive only a reduced bonus) for any excesses. 3 5
Finally, MCOs utilize various forms of clinical rules to im-
pose limitations upon the provider's behavior. Through the use
of utilization review, treatment protocols, practice guidelines
and quality assurance programs, MCOs may dictate what modes
of treatment a provider is encouraged to undertake.36 MCOs use
case managers to review medical records and treatment proce-
dures to ensure that providers are delivering services according
to MCO guidelines.37 Providers who do not satisfactorily follow
MCO rules can be penalized through withhold arrangements or
may be completely excluded from participation in the MCO.38
Exclusion is a particularly daunting penalty, since it could mean
the loss of substantial business for the provider.39 MCOs may
also control providers who do not conform to MCO rules by re-
quiring them to obtain authorization for referrals or treatment
procedures and by limiting their access to MCO facilities. 40
28. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 25, at 1027.
29. Id.
30. Latham, supra note 26, at 404.
31. Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 25, at 1027.




36. Iglehart, supra note 15, at 1167.
37. See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 Nmv ENG. J. MED. 604, 604
(1995) [hereinafter Conflicts in Managed Care].
38. See Sanders, supra note 17, at 82.
39. Id. at 82-83.
40. Id. at 83.
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In sum, managed care seeks to contain health care costs by
shifting all risks to the provider. MCOs then control the pro-
vider's behavior through the use of financial incentives, penaliz-
ing or rewarding the provider in the form of monetary compen-
sation. Although managed care has been comparatively
successful in containing health care costs, it may be "losing
sight of what should be the overriding purpose of health care-
the well being of the patient."41
II. PROBLEMS MCOs CREATE FOR CONSUMERS
The increased impetus for the physician to control costs has
obvious and direct implications for the consumer. By delegating
responsibility to individual caregivers, physicians are caught be-
tween the patient and the health care plan.42 The creation of
split loyalties underlies many of the problems associated with
managed care.43 Professor Marc Rodwin points out that, concep-
tually, managed care is extremely contradictory:4
Within each MCO are multiple actors who may have incompatible inter-
ests, including patients, physicians, case managers, administrators, and
third party payers. Furthermore, each of these groups have several inter-
ests that are in conflict with one another. For example, physicians are
agents for their patients. But they are often also employees of managed-
care organizations or enter into contracts with them and have ... legal
obligations to the interests of owners or shareholders as well as to the
care of patients.45
Considering the immense degree of pressure placed on physi-
cians to contain costs, along with personal interests and loyalty
concerns, there is a strong likelihood that a patient's welfare is
overlooked.46 Such concern is particularly imperative considering
the patient's usual lack of knowledge about medicine and/or the
health care system. As a result, consumers must be aware of
three concerns when receiving health services.
41. Vernillia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk-
Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET
SouND L. REv. 1, 4 (1993).
42. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loy-
alties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242
(1995) [hereinafter Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor].
43. Id.
44. See Conflicts in Managed Care, supra note 37, at 604.
45. Id.
46. Rodwin, supra note 8, at 8-9.
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A. Quality of Care
Numerous studies have attempted to determine whether
managed care plans provide higher or lower quality care than
fee-for-service programs.4 7 The studies have proven inconclusive,
with reports reaching various results.43 Most studies tend to
conclude that MCOs present services that are at least
equivalent to those available in fee-for-service programs.4 9 Re-
gardless of study findings, consumers must be aware that the
fundamental mechanisms of managed care present incentives to
minimize quality concerns and emphasize cost containment.50
Stephen Latham, Director of the Ethics Division of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, acknowledges that consumers have le-
gitimate fears concerning inferior care:
Consumers should certainly be afraid of the potential for certain incen-
tive plans to impact adversely on individual clinical decisions: the deci-
sion to send a patient home from the hospital a day earlier, the decision
not to order an additional test, the decision to recommend one treatment
over another, or to delay treatment. In particular, consumers should be
worried about the possibility that a large enough amount of money may
be at stake in a personal financial gain to overwhelm his medical
judgment.51
Ultimately, inquiries regarding managed care and quality de-
pend upon the type of services provided. Studies clearly demon-
strate that HMOs do not use costly treatment procedures as
often as traditional indemnity plans. 52 HMOs had a lower rate
of cesarean sections, and instead encouraged vaginal birth.5"
One study found lower testing rates for patients with heart
conditions.54
47. Fee-for-service refers to the traditional indemnity system that existed before
managed care. Under fee-for-service, insurers enter into a contract and reimburse an in-
dividual for medical services rendered, or directly pay the provider. In this scenario, the
insurer has no control over the choice of the provider or services rendered. See Issues,
Reform Proposals and Trade-Offs, supra note 15, at 132 n.1.
48. See Franks, supra note 17, at 425.
49. Zellman, supra note 7, at 159.
50. See SHELDA HARDEN, WHAT LEGISLATORS NEED To KNow ABOUT MANAGED CARE 4
(1994).
51. Latham, supra note 26, at 409.
52. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or
Worse Quality of Care?, HEA T AFs., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 10.
53. See generally A.D. Tussing & M.A. Wojtowycz, Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions, Independent Practice Associations and Cesarean Section Rates, HEALTH SERVICES
RES., Apr. 1994, at 80; D.E. King & K. Lahiri, Socioeconomic Factors and the Odds of
Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Delivery, 272 JAMA 524, 526 (1994).
54. See N.R. Every et al., Resource Utilization in Treatment of Acute Myocardial In-
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In addition, MCOs often encourage physicians to prescribe
less effective medicine to patients because such medicine is less
expensive.55 MCOs often develop drug formularies which contain
a select list of prescription drugs available under HMO plans.
Physicians are often required by contract to prescribe drugs only
according to the formulary.56
Despite individual findings, however, studies regarding
quality of care have produced mixed results. Professors Robert
Miller and Harold Luft reviewed over thirty-seven studies, and
found equal numbers of positive and negative results for HIIMO
performance. 57
Perhaps the most consistent finding in quality-of-care stud-
ies is with regard to poor, elderly, disabled and chronic care pa-
tients. A study in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion found that elderly, poor and disabled enrollees deteriorated
in health more quickly than similar patients in fee-for-service
plans. 58 The elderly patient was twice as likely to decline in
physical health when enrolled in an HMO.59 Although poor,
chronically ill patients did not deteriorate as rapidly, accelerated
declines were nonetheless apparent.60
Because elderly and chronically ill patients generally cost
more to treat and have a smaller chance of recovery, MCOs are
particularly inclined to limit services to these patients. MCOs
would rather spend their resources on preventative and routine
medical services as a form of loss prevention.61
Quality monitoring is critical to ensure that MCOs do not
emphasize cost savings at the expense of consumer interests. As
methods develop for accurately measuring quality of care, such
methods will become increasingly important when making
faretion: Staff Model HMO Versus Fee-for-Service Hospitals, 1995 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY
401.
55. See Christopher Snowbeck, Pill Smart: Knowledge Is Power for Patients as In-
surance Companies Extend Their Reach into the Medicine Cabinet, Prrr. PosT GAZ ErT,
Dec. 9, 1997, at G6.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 52.
58. John E. Ware, Jr. et al., Differences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and
Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 JAMA
1039, 1042 (1996).
59. Id. at 1046.
60. Id. at 1043.
61. Richard Kirsch, Executive Director of Citizen Action of New York, observed that
"'Managed Care works very well for routine medical care, but patients with more seri-
ous illnesses encounter the biggest problems." Henry C. Davis, State's Managed Care
Safeguards Take Effect, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al.
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health care rationing decisions.62 In the meantime, consumers
must become actively involved in the decision-making process,
asking many questions and learning about various treatment
options.
B. Choice/Access
Managed Care enrollees are limited in choice and access
from two perspectives. First, an enrollee is required to seek
treatment only from a provider who is listed within the HIMO's
network.63 Upon joining an HMO, the enrollee will usually re-
ceive a list of physicians from which he or she may seek treat-
ment. If the enrollee seeks treatment from a different provider,
the HMO will often refuse to pay for the services or charge a
higher fee."
Second, under the gatekeeper system, consumers are not al-
lowed to obtain access to a specialist without first receiving a
referral from the PCP.65 The managed care plan's procedures are
designed to mediate medical choices in a manner consistent
with its objectives, and are rigidly enforced. 66 A dermatologist
recently described an incident wherein a patient made an ap-
pointment to see him despite the wishes of the PCP.67 During
the visit, the patient received a phone call from the PCP, infuri-
ated that the patient went to see the dermatologist without his
62. Numerous analysts are currently developing more accurate techniques to mea-
sure quality of care. MCOs often use the Health Plan Employer Data and Information
Set (HEDIS) to measure quality. HEDIS is a standardized set of 60 performance mea-
sures in, among others, the areas of quality, access and patient satisfaction. See Allyson
M. Pollock, M.D. & Dorothy P. Rice, Monitoring Health Care in the US.: A Challenging
Task, 112 PUB. HEALTH REP. 108, 111 (1997). See also Kathleen N. Lohr, How Do We
Measure Quality?, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 22 (offering a brief perspective on
comparative quality measurement in health care). Another potential measure of quality
is accreditation. Various organizations, most notably the National Commission for Qual-
ity Assurance (NCQA), evaluate MCOs based on numerous factors. See Alice G. Gosfield,
Who is Holding Whom Accountable for Quality?, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 34; Jo-
seph W. Thompson et al., The NCQA's Quality Compass: Evaluating Managed Care in
the United States, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 152. Surprisingly, only one-third of
all plans evaluated by accreditation agencies (about half of all existing MCOs) received
full three-year accreditation. See Martin Gottlieb, Picking a Health Plan: A Shot in the
Dark, N.Y. Tism, Jan. 14, 1996, § 3 (Money & Business), at 1.
63. See Iglehart, supra note 15, at 1167.
64. See Issues, Reform Proposals and Trade-Offs, supra note 15, at 1330.
65. See What are the Issues?, supra note 15, at 1014.
66. Id.
67. See James Shaw, Economics and the Examination Room: An Incident, THE LAN.
cFT, Jan. 13, 1996, at 124.
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referral. 68 The dermatologist described his disbelief as he
watched his patient defend her decision to see a dermatologist
without the PCP's permission.69
Although discouragement of specialty care services will cer-
tainly reduce health care cost burdens, the incident described
above raises questions regarding patient autonomy. If a patient
is dissatisfied with a PCP's diagnosis and/or prognosis, then she
is unable to obtain a second opinion unless the MCO gives per-
mission. This scenario raises doubts concerning whether a pa-
tient is entitled to determine his or her own course of
treatment.
C. Doctor-Patient Relationship
Managed care presents a potential conflict of interest under
the doctor-patient relationship. According to the Hippocratic
oath, physicians are ethically obliged to heal patients, act on
their behalf and honor their trust.7° However, by shifting liabil-
ity risks and financial incentives, managed care often pits the
physician's interests against those of the patient.7 1 As a result, a
patient can no longer assume that a prescribed medication or
treatment is the best method to cure his or her condition.
Rather, a patient is often left to wonder whether the prescribed
treatment is simply the cheapest method and not necessarily
the most effective.
For the consumer, the doctor-patient relationship is an ex-
tremely important factor in the delivery of health services. A
person's physical health is directly related to his or her ability
to maintain a quality lifestyle, and when either is not well he or
she feels particularly apprehensive and at the mercy of the phy-
68. Id. Dr. Shaw wrote that his lasting reaction to the incident was "[s]adness that
the practice of medicine is now driven by market forces that are apparently more impor-
tant than the wishes of the patient." Id. Marshall Kapp notes the problem with patient
autonomy and the gatekeeper system:
[G]atekeepers have a strong incentive to emphasize economic efficiency in their
allocation of services, because increasingly they themselves are at financial
risk for inefficiency and waste. This management goal may conflict in practice
with the gatekeeper's desire to respect client autonomy, because the client's
choices are not always the most rational from the standpoint of the total sys-
tem's distribution of resources and cost-containment objectives.
Marshall Kapp, Enhancing Autonomy and Choice in Selecting and Directing Long-Term
Care Services, 4 ELDER L.J. 55, 72 (1996) (citations omitted).
69. Shaw, supra note 67, at 124.
70. See Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor, supra note 42, at 246.
71. Id. at 252.
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sician.72 A patient's dependence on the physician's experience
and training necessitates a relationship where patients can feel
assured that the physician is loyally acting in the patient's best
interests.73
Thus, the doctor acts as a fiduciary owing a "fimdamental
duty to place the patient's interests first, above not only the
physician's personal interests but also the interests of other pa-
tients.74 Fiduciaries must be trustworthy, reliable and honest.7 5
Such a relationship could be compared to a lawyer's duty to a
client or a trustee's duty to a beneficiary 7 6 Anything that inter-
feres with the fiduciary's loyalty is considered a conflict of inter-
est. 7 Managed care creates an apparent conflict of interest
which threatens the fiduciary relationship.
In addition to weakening any fiduciary and/or ethical re-
sponsibilities, MCOs also affect the doctor-patient relationship
by disrupting the continuity of care.7 8 Traditionally, doctors
worked as solo practitioners in a small, comfortable office set-
ting and were often family friends of the patient.7 9 Maintaining
a close, longstanding relationship with a physician provided sev-
eral benefits. First, familiarity with a patient's medical history
and personal and behavioral traits allowed a physician to make
more accurate diagnoses.80 Second, patients felt more comforta-
ble seeking care, and did so before the severity of any illness be-
came acute.81 Lastly, continuity of care prevented the patient
from undergoing duplicative tests and continually filling out
medical history charts.82
72. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relation-
ship, 5 HEALTH MATX 141, 147 (1995).
73. See Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor, supra note 42, at 245-46.
74. Orentlicher, supra note 72, at 147.
75. For more discussion regarding the physician's role as a fiduciary, see generally
Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor, supra note 42.
76. Id. at 245.
77. Id.
78. See Orentlicher, supra note 72, at 148.
79. Marc Rodwin refers to Norman Rockwell's portrait of the family physician in
two magazine covers of the Saturday Evening Post. Rodwin, supra note 8, at 2.
80. See generally id.
81. Professor David Orentlicher cites several studies concluding "that continuity of
care leads to greater satisfaction by patients with their medical care and increases the
likelihood that they will follow their medication regimens and keep their appointments
with physicians." Orentlicher, supra note 72, at 143 (citation omitted). See also Allen J.
Dietrich & Keith I. Marton, Does Continuous Care from a Physician Make a Difference?,
15 J. FAm. PRnc. 929, 931 (1982); Gregory L Weiss & Cornellia A. Ramsey, Regular
Source of Primary Medical Care and Patient Satisfaction, 15 QuAuLTy Ray. BuLL. 180,
181 (1989).
82. Orentlicher, supra note 72, at 144.
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Moreover, the complex organization of managed care may
intimidate and confuse patients. The traditional doctor-patient
relationship was primarily a one-on-one interaction, where the
physician could explain the treatment being administered and
comfort the patient regarding treatment.83 However, the patient
and physician "are often strangers who meet in impersonal in-
stitutions."84 As a result, consumers may not be receiving the
same individual attention due to "organizational pathologies." 85
As Marc Rodwin points out, "[o]rganizations can create bureau-
cratic mazes that impede change and diminish responsiveness to
consumers. They can diffuse responsibility and authority,
thereby reducing organizational accountability. They also can
limit the autonomy of professionals, reduce their initiative and
discourage creativity."86 Although managed care cannot be sin-
gled as the sole cause of the deterioration of the doctor-patient
relationship, it certainly holds much of the responsibility. Ques-
tions regarding doctor-patient loyalty, combined with increased
systemization and corporatization have created a climate of dis-
trust and unfamiliarity.
III. MANAGED CARE LEGISLATION
Concerns regarding quality, choice and loyalty have caused
consumers to question whether the potential benefits of man-
aged care outweighs its detriments. Consumer concerns, com-
bined with physician resentment over usurpation of control and
autonomy, have created a "backlash" against managed care.8 7
Once considered the "magic elixir" for the nation's health care
problems, managed care has recently become subject to in-
creased scrutiny.8
The popular press has played a crucial role in creating the
managed care backlash. A recent study looked at over 2,132
newspaper stories and seventy-two television broadcasts about
83. See Randall, supra note 41, at 3.
84. Rodwin, supra note 8, at 2.
85. Issues, Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, supra note 15, at 1329. "Organiza-
tional pathologies" refers to problems presented when organizations grow into large bu-
reaucracies. See generally W. RICHARD Scorr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND
OPEN SYSTEMS (1992) (discussing problems associated with organizational pathologies).
86. Issues, Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, supra note 15, at 1329.
87. See Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335
N. ENG. J. MED. 1601 (1996).
88. See Spencer Rich, Managed Care, Once an Elixir, Goes Under the Legislative
Knife, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al.
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managed care between the years 1990 and 1997.89 Whereas a
majority of press coverage in the early 1990s involved business
and corporate matters, stories were increasingly being published
about the managed care backlash. 90 Stories regarding patient
and consumer issues increased from seventeen percent of total
coverage in 1991 to forty-four percent in 1997. 91 Furthermore,
the press have been more inclined to publish "high drama" sto-
ries, relaying anecdotes where death or life-altering events oc-
curred-portraying the MCO as the "villain."92 Overall in 1997,
twenty-eight percent of all coverage was critical of managed
care, while four percent was positive and sixty-eight percent
neutral.93 Most primarily negative coverage consisted of publica-
tions and broadcasts aimed at the general public.94
The study concludes that the increased negative coverage
has a direct effect upon public opinion:
When people are asked about specific examples taken from news stories
about some reported problems with managed care, the public's perception
is that these are fairly common occurrences. For example, two-thirds of
Americans believe that an HMO holding back on a child's cancer treat-
ment is something that happens "often" (26 percent) or "sometimes" (40
percent). Two of five persons (39 percent) think that newborn babies are
being sent home after just one day because of managed care plan's policy
... . The anecdotal drama in the stories "gets through," despite the
overwhelming number of other managed care stories that contain none of
these characteristic references.95
Thus, it is clear that the popular press has had an adverse ef-
fect upon public perception. Out of five studies measuring over-
all satisfaction with managed care, four found that MCO enroll-
ees were unhappy with their health care plan.96 This
dissatisfaction prompts state and federal legislators to impose
89. Mollyann Brodie et al., Media Coverage of Managed Care: Is There a Negative
Bias?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 9, 12.
90. Id. at 12.
91. Id. at 14.
92. Id. at 15.
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id. at 22-23. See also Paul Ellwood & George Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work
in Progress, 276 JAMA 1083, 1084 (1996).
95. Brodia, supra note 89, at 23. Indeed, many analysts fear that the media is bi-
ased against managed care, creating a public fervor that is not warranted. One analyst
stated that media coverage of MCOs has been akin to shouting "Fire!" in a crowded the-
ater. Karen Ignagni, Covering a Breaking Revolution: The Media and Managed Care,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 26, 29. See also Zellman, supra note 7, at 159.
96. See Miller & Lull, supra note 52, at 11. See also K. Davis et al., Choice Matters:
Enrollees' Views of Their Health Plans, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 99, 104.
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regulatory measures.97
The impetus upon legislators to regulate is increased by the
inability of the legal field to determine the scope of MCO liabil-
ity. Prior to 1996, MCOs were primarily regulated through ER-
ISA, state insurance guidelines and licensing requirements.98 A
plaintiff could institute a negligence action against an MCO ei-
ther through state or federal court.
MCOs have generally preferred to try a negligence case in
federal court. ERISA often shielded MCOs from liability based
upon the belief that an MCO's denial and/or approval of health
services is *a "benefit determination."99 It is well-established in
federal court that a participant in a health plan "may not sue in
tort for injuries flowing from decisions about what benefits are
to be paid under a plan."100 If an MCO negligence suit was com-
menced as a state claim in a state court, the MCO's attorneys
would likely first attempt to remove the case to federal court
under § 502(a)(1)(B), or if the attorneys failed in their motion-
they would argue for general preemption of the claim under §
514.101
As a result, attorneys for MCO enrollees often challenged
the removal of an action to federal court. Before 1996, however,
the legal system was unable to determine definitively whether
MCO liability is applicable to ERISA. Whereas a number of
97. Health care analyst Donald Moran observes that:
The average American is bombarded by a steady stream of anecdotes about the
adverse health consequences of patient management decisions made in the con-
text of managed care. Popular perception, when combined with editorial atten-
tion, rapidly coalesces around theme issues... that have sufficient snap to en-
sure that the first politician to the micro-phone will be rewarded with ample
media exposure.
Moran, supra note 6, at 9. See also David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds Over Managed
Care: Frustrated Consumers Push for Tougher Laws, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1997, at Al.
98. See Eleanor Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health
Plans, 22 Ams. J.L. & IED. 300, 307 (1996).
99. Sylvia L. Wenger, Comment, New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
et al. v. Traveler's Ins. Co. et al.: Medical Malpractice and Enabling Regulation in the
States Again, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131, 132 (1996).
100. Corcoran v. United Health Care, 965 F.2d 1321, 1329-30 (5th Cir. 1992). See Pi-
lot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986); Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
101. See eg., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321. See also Wenger, supra note 99, at 143-44.
The ERISA preemption clause is stated in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a): "[T]he provisions of [ER-
ISA]. . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any [covered) employee benefit plan.! For discussion of the ERISA preemption
clause see generally Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 45-46; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97; Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
courts ruled that claims against MCOs "relate to" ERISA, 10 2 va-
rious courts ruled otherwise. 0 3
Although recent trends indicate that federal courts are be-
ginning to rule consistently against ERISA preemption, 10 4 the
earlier confusion surrounding HMO liability simply serves as
additional incentive for state regulation.
IV. NEW YORK HEALTH CARE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
States have been relatively quick to enact managed care
legislation. Other than satisfying consumer concerns and ad-
dressing questions regarding the application of ERISA, states
have additional incentives to regulate managed care. As large
purchasers of health services on behalf of state employees, retir-
ees, prisoners and workers' compensation beneficiaries, state
legislatures are extremely interested in maintaining an effective
health care system.1 5 States are also concerned that if unregu-
lated, MCOs will limit access to the poor and high-risk popula-
tions, shifting the burden to state-run Medicaid programs. 06
Most state legislation addresses only single concerns, such
as access to emergency care, length of maternity stay or disclo-
sure requirements. 0 7 However, other states have passed more
comprehensive bills, with New York being the most notable. 08
The New York Health Care Protection Act (HCCPA) is a pack-
age of amendments that change and/or repeal various sections of
102. See e.g. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Services, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110
(D. Md. 1994).
103. See e.g. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); Rich v.
Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l Inc., 28 F.3d 269 (2d
Cir. 1994); Tufino v. N.Y. Hotel & Motel Trades Council, 644 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (1st Dept.
1996).
104. One leading case demonstrating the recent tendency to deny ERISA preemp-
tion is New York Conf of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, et al. v. Travelers Ins. Co. et
al., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). For a detailed discussion of this case see Wenger, supra note 99,
at 131-37.
105. See Trish Riley, The Role of States in Accountability for Quality, HEALTH AFF.,
May-June 1997, at 41. See also Emily Friedman, Managed Care, Rationing, and Quality:
A Tangled Relationship, HFALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 174-75.
106. See Colleen M. Grogan, Hope in Federalism? What Can the States Do and What
Are They Likely To Do?, 20 J. HFALTH, POL. & L. 477, 477 (1995). Medicaid is the fastest
growing item in the state budgets. Total state spending increased from $27.7 billion in
1981 to $112.9 billion in 1992, and has doubled since 1988. Id.
107. Consumers at Risk-July, supra note 10 (spot:key findings).
108. Families USA identified Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Rhode Island, Virginia and
W, Virginia as states with comprehensive HMO legislation. Id.
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the New York Public Health Law and Insurance Law.0 9 In de-
ciding how to develop health care legislation, Governor Pataki
called on an unusual coalition of insurers, business leaders,
medical officials and consumer advocates to participate in legis-
lative hearings discussing potential inclusions in the new bill. 110
Accordingly, the health care package addresses a wide range of
issues, including numerous provisions dealing with consumer
concerns discussed earlier in this Comment."'
A. Quality of Care
Unlike any other state, New York addresses quality of care
problems by establishing a two-tier review system. A "-Utiliza-
tion Review Agent"1 2 (UR agent) handles all denials of treat-
ment based on "medical necessity," while all other complaints
are referred to an internal grievance procedure. 13 Section 10 of
the HCCPA specifies guidelines for utilization review. The provi-
sion requires that all UR agents register biennially with the
State Commissioner and furnish a "utilization review plan" that
describes all written "clinical review criteria" for determina-
tion."14 The UR plan must be developed by a qualified and ex-
perienced health care professional, and include a description of
practice guidelines and standards used by the UR agent." 5 Spe-
cifically, the legislation imposes UR standards which include
procedures for, among other things, appointing a medical direc-
tor, establishing clinical review criteria and ensuring
109. See generally 1996 N.Y. LAwS 705.
110. Id. at (spot:states with best protections). See Henry Davis, State's Managed
Care Safeguards Take Effect, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al.
111. A complete copy of the New York HCCPA is contained in 1996 N.Y. LAws 705.
The sections of the HCCPA which I refer to in the text are from the session law. How-
ever, in the footnotes I cite the specific provision in McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York Annotated so that the reader is able to find the codified version.
112. A "utilization review agent" means "any company, organization or other entity
performing utilization review," except: (a) an agency of the federal government; (b) an
agent acting on behalf of the federal government, but only to the extent that the agent
is providing services to the federal government; (c) an agent acting on behalf of the state
and local government for services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act; (d) a
hospital's internal quality assurance program, unless associated with a health care fi-
nancing mechanism; and (e) any insurer subject to Article 32 or 43 of the Insurance Law
and any independent utilization review agent performing services under a contract with
such insurer. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4900(9) (McKinney 1997).
113. Families USA, New York Managed Care Legislation: A Model for Other States
(last modified June 7, 1996) <http//epn.org/families/fastat.html> (spot:discussion) (on file
with author and the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter New New York Managed Care].
114. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4901 (McKinney 1997).
115. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4902 (McKinney 1997).
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confidentiality.116
UR agents are limited in the amount of time for a determi-
nation depending upon the type of review involved. For retro-
spective reviews of services already rendered, the UR agent has
thirty days after the receipt of all necessary information to
make a determination.117 A UR determination must occur within
three days for preauthorization services, and only one day for
"continued or extended health care services."118
Any adverse determination by the UR agent may be ap-
pealed by the enrollee, either under a standard or expedited
time frame. The enrollee has forty-five days to appeal a decision,
which will be considered by a "clinical peer reviewer."" 9 A pro-
vider may request an expedited appeal if he or she believes that
an immediate appeal is warranted, as long as the case does not
involve retrospective services. Continued or extended health
care services may also utilize the expedited appeal system. In
either instance, a clinical peer reviewer (other than the person
who made the initial determination) must be accessible within
one day, and make a determination within two days after re-
116. In regard to Utilization Review standards, Section 10 states:
(a) Appointment of a Medical Director, who is a licensed physician; provided,
however, that the utilization review agent may appoint a clinical director when
utilization review is performed for a discrete category of health care service...
(b) Development of written policies and procedures that govern all aspects of
the utilization review process and a requirement that a utilization review
agent shall maintain and make available to enrollees and health care providers
a written description of such procedures including procedures to appeal an ad-
verse determination; (c) Utilization of written clinical review criteria developed
pursuant to a utilization review plan; (d) Establishment of a process for ren-
dering utilization review determinations; (e) Establishment of a written proce-
dure to assure that the notice of an adverse determination includes: (i) the
reasons for the determination including the clinical rational, if any;
(ii) instructions on how to initiate an appeal; (iii) notice of the availability...
of the clinical criteria... ; (f) Establishment of a requirement that appropriate
personnel of the utilization review agent are reasonably accessible by toll-free
telephone... ; (g) Establishment of appropriate policies and procedures to en-
sure that all applicable state and federal laws to protect the confidentiality of
individual medical records are followed; (h) Establishment of a requirement
that emergency services rendered to an enrollee shall not be subject to prior
authorization nor shall reimbursement for such services be denied on retro-
spective review; provided, however, that such services are medically necessary
to stabilize or treat an emergency condition.
Id.
117. See N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 4903(4) (McKinney 1997).
118. N.Y. PuB. HFALTH LAw §§ 4903(2), 4903(3) (McKinney 1997).
119. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4900 (McKinney 1997) (defining a "clinical peer re-
viewer" as (a) a licensed physician or (b) a health care professional "who typically man-
ages the medical condition, procedure or treatment under review.").
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ceipt of all necessary information. 120 If the expedited review
agrees with the initial determination, the enrollee may resort to
the standard appeal system. A UR agent must acknowledge the
filing of a standard appeal within fifteen days and make a deci-
sion within sixty days. In addition, notification of the appeal de-
cision must be delivered to the enrollee within two days.121
Utilization review procedures only include coverage issues
which involve construing the term "medical necessity."12 2 Any
other complaints, such as denial of acceptance into the network,
range of services covered and administrative disputes, are re-
ferred to an internal grievance system.123 Under Section 15 of
the HCCPA, "an insurer which offers a managed care product
[must] establish and maintain a grievance procedure with re-
gard to such managed care product." 24 MCOs must notify en-
rollees of the grievance procedure in the member's handbook
and include information concerning how to file a complaint.
MCOs must ensure that enrollees, particularly non-English
speaking members, have access to the grievance system.125 In
most cases, grievances must be resolved within forty-five days. 26
However, disputes concerning referrals or range of coverage ben-
efits must be resolved within thirty days. If the delay may po-
tentially endanger the enrollee's health, the MCO has only
forty-eight hours to render a decision. 27 Appeals may be filed
within sixty days and be addressed within thirty business days,
unless there is a risk to the member's health (wherein appeals
must be addressed within two business days).128
B. Freedom of Choice/Access
With fifty-eight million people enrolled in HMOs and an-
other eighty-one million in other types of MCOs, the rapid
growth of MCO enrollment (about six million per year) is a
cause of concern for state governments. 29 As the number of en-
120. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4903(6) (McKinney 1997).
121. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4904(3) (McKinney 1997).
122. New New York Managed Care, supra note 113 (spot:grievance and UR tracts
for denials of care).
123. Id.
124. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4802(a) (McKinney 1997).
125. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 4802(b) (McKinney 1997).
126. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 4802(d) (McKinney 1997).
127. Id.
128. See N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 4802(h), 4802(k) (McKinney 1997).
129. See generally supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. See also Milt
Freudenheim, Health Care in the Era of Capitalism, N.Y. TmEs, Apr. 7, 1996, at 4(6).
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rollees increase, medical facilities must also expand proportion-
ately in order to meet the increased demand. If MCO facilities
are unable to meet the needs of its members, a significant back-
log of cases may arise, creating access problems for the commu-
nity at large. The HCCPA attempts to curtail any potential ac-
cess problems by requiring MCOs to "maintain[ ] a network of
health care providers adequate to meet the comprehensive
health needs of its enrollees."130 The availability of medical ser-
vices must be geographically accessible, and must allow mem-
bers to choose from at least three PCPs.131 Upon application for
a license, the State Health Commissioner must review the avail-
ability of appropriate and timely care-taking into account time
and distance standards.13 2 The standards adopt a subjective
viewpoint by determining appropriate time and distance accord-
ing to local norms. The Commissioner must also consider re-
quirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act and en-
sure that care is "culturally and linguistically competent."133
In addition to physical facilities, the HCCPA requires the
availability of skilled and experienced providers that are able to
meet an enrollee's needs. If an HMO does not have a provider
with sufficient experience to deliver competent care, the organi-
zation must allow an outside referral to a provider who is able
to treat the patient effectively. The outside referral should be
pursuant to a "treatment plan," developed in consultation with
the PCP, HMO and enrollee.134 The HMO must cover the ex-
penses of the non-network provider with no additional cost to
the enrollee beyond what he or she would pay under normal
coverage. 35 In addition, New York allows a "standing referral"
whenever the patient needs ongoing care. 36 Thus, an enrollee
may maintain a long-standing relationship with a non-network
provider with no additional cost, as long as the HMO does not
retain any provider with sufficient training and/or experience.
Members who require specialized treatment over a pro-
longed period of time may be able to see a specialist without re-
ceiving a referral for every visit. 3v HMOs are required to estab-
lish procedures to treat enrollees with life-threatening or
130. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4403(5)(a) (McKinney 1997).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4403(5)(b)(ii) (McKinney 1997).
134. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4403(6)(a) (McKinney 1997).
135. Id.
136. See New New York Managed Care, supra note 113 (spot:access and continuity
of care).
137. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4403 (McKinney 1997).
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disabling and degenerative conditions to "receive a referral to a
specialist with expertise in treating the life-threatening or de-
generative and disabling condition who shall be responsible for
and capable of providing and coordinating the enrollee's primary
and specialty care."138 If the enrollee is new to the network, he
or she may receive ongoing treatment from a non-network pro-
vider for up to ninety days.139 Pregnant women in their second
or third trimester who are new to the network may also con-
tinue to see a non-network provider "for a transitional period
that includes the provision of postpartum care directly related to
the delivery."140 Although a few states have requirements for
continuity of care following provider termination, none have pro-
visions allowing ongoing treatment for new enrollees.'4 '
C. Disclosure Requirements
One of the underlying problems in the delivery of health
services is the unequal distribution of knowledge between the
patient and provider. This disparity of information is aggravated
by managed care. HMO members and prospective enrollees re-
ceive little or no information about the health care plan, and
often encounter difficulties when trying to obtain data.142 The
Public Advocate for the City of New York made over five hun-
dred calls to HMO consumer service centers and received little
information about plan coverage and quality of care indica-
tors.'4 Callers were put on hold for long periods of time, and re-
ceived vague, incorrect or contradictory answers to questions.'4
In response, most states require HMOs to disclose specified
information to members or prospective enrollees or, at least,
make the data available upon request. 45 New York's disclosure
requirements are substantially more inclusive than other state
regulations, including an exhaustive list of items that must be
available to members. 46 Under the HCCPA, HMOs must include
138. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4403(6)(c) (McKinney 1997).
139. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4403(6)(e)(1) (McKinney 1997).
140. Id.
141. See New New York Managed Care, supra note 113.
142. Id.
143. See Consumers at Risk-July, supra note 10 (spot:consumer information and
confidentiality). See also Martin Gottlieb, Picking a Health Plan: A Shot in the Dark,
N.Y. TiEs, Jan. 14, 1996, at 3(1).
144. Consumers At Risk-July, supra note 10 (spot:consumer information and
confidentiality).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 28.
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in their member handbook or subscriber contract a description
of: coverage and benefits, utilization review procedures, reim-
bursement methodologies, grievance procedures and outside re-
ferral policies, among others.147 In addition, the HMO must fur-
nish a list of all participating providers, classified by specialty,
and the organization must notify a member when his or her pro-
vider is leaving the health care plan.148
While this information is automatically disclosed in a mem-
ber's handbook, additional data must be furnished upon request
by the health care plan member or prospective enrollee. HMOs
must provide upon request: names and addresses of board mem-
bers, officers or "controlling persons," a most recent annual fi-
nancial statement, procedures for protecting the confidentiality
of medical records, drug formularies and clinical review criteria,
among others.149
D. Physician-Patient Relationship
The HCCPA indirectly protects consumers through several
provisions which aim to free the provider from MCO intrusions
upon his or her practice. By including several provider protec-
tions, the New York legislature is attempting to restore some of
the physician's fiduciary responsibilities that have been lost in
the wake of MCO proliferation. 50 Providers often complain that
they are caught between their roles as a patient advocate and
MCO contractee.' 51 The lack of provider protections often allow
MCOs to terminate the contract or punish providers whenever
they do not conform with the organization's best interests. In ef-
147. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4408(1) (McKinney 1997). Other disclosure re-
quirements include: prior authorization requirements; the enrollee's financial responsi-
bilities for services in and out of the network; twenty-four hour emergency services; pro-
cedures to select and change primary and specialty care providers; notice of access to
specialty health care for people with life-threatening, degenerative, or disabling condi-
tions; procedures whereby the enrollee may participate in the development of HMO poli-
cies; procedures for addressing the needs of non-English speaking members; addresses
and phone numbers to receive information about the plan; and an annually updated list
of contracting facilities. Id.
148. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4408(1)(r) (McKinney 1997).
149. See N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 4408(2) (McKinney 1997). Additional data upon
request includes: a copy of the most recent subscriber contract; information relating to
consumer complaints; written description of the quality assurance program; procedures
in determining whether drugs are experimental or investigational; provider affiliations
with participating hospitals; and written application procedures and qualification re-
quirements for health care providers. Id.
150. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
151. See infra Part II.C. See also New New York Managed Care, supra note 113
(spot:provider protections).
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fect, these limitations compromise the ability of providers to act
in the patient's best interest.
In order to mitigate the tension between the provider's roles
as a fiduciary and MCO agent, the HCCPA implements several
measures that regulate the termination of a physician from a
managed care contract. The HCCPA disallows any termination
based solely on an incident where a provider has "advocated on
behalf of the enrollee."152 Section 3 also protects against any re-
taliation by the MCO if a provider files a complaint or appeals a
decision by the plan. 5 3 A physician can now maintain loyalty to
the Hippocratic oath and act on behalf of his or her patient
without worrying about punishment that may ensue from the
MCO. Likewise, patients may feel more assured that the doctor
is acting in their best interests.
Some MCO contracts have included provisions called "gag
clauses" that limit the ability of a provider to discuss certain
treatment options or disclose financial arrangements with the
patient. Managed care executives argue that they should be al-
lowed to include gag clauses because they have the right to
maintain confidentiality regarding business information and em-
ployment contracts. 154 Providers have severely criticized the use
of gag clauses, claiming that they unfairly interfere with the
physician's daily practice. 155
As complaints increased, lawmakers started to investigate
the existence of gag clauses, and found surprising results. In
Colorado, one legislator discovered that doctors were not allowed.
to tell cancer patients that they thought a bone marrow trans-
plant would be beneficial. 56 Because of the obvious infringement
152. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-d(5)(a) (McKinney 1997).
153. Section 3 provides:
No health care plan shall terminate a contract or employment, or refuse to re-
new a contract, solely because a health care provider has: (a) advocated on be-
half of an enrollee; (b) filed a complaint against the health care plan; (c) ap-
pealed a decision of the health care plan; (d) provided information or filed a
report pursuant [to this section]; or (e) requested a hearing or review pursuant
to this section.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-d(5) (McKinney 1997).
154. See Robert Pear, Laws Won't Let HMOs Tell Doctors What to Say, N.Y. TImEs,
Sept. 17, 1996, at A12.
155. Consumers at Risk-July, supra note 10 (spot:protection 8:prohibition against
gag rules). For a detailed discussion on gag clauses, see Julia A. Martin & Lisa K.
Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22
Ai. J.L. & MED. 433 (1996).
156. Pear, supra note 154, at A12. Pear also mentions instances where psychologists
and psychiatrists were not permitted to inform patients about HMO limitations until af-
ter three or four visits. 'The therapists... were not allowed to tell patients of these lim-
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on the doctor-patient relationship and the compromise of the
quality of care, gag clauses have received much attention from
the media and, consequently, the public.157
New York was among several states that passed prohibi-
tions against gag clauses.15 8 Section 4 of the HCCPA provides
that no health care plan may prohibit the provider from disclos-
ing to a patient all potential courses of treatment. In addition,
MCOs cannot prevent the disclosure of physician contract
details.159
New York's prohibition is much more strict than other
states because it prohibits the withholding of either treatment
options or information about the plan itself. Many states only
prohibit the nondisclosure of treatment options. 60 In fact, many
managed care representatives agree that doctors should be able
to discuss freely treatment options with his or her patients. 16'
On the other hand, disclosure of business information and de-
tails of employment contracts is too intrusive in the eyes of
many HMO executives. 62
In some instances, disclosure of contract details and infor-
mation about the HMO may give a patient insight into the moti-
vations of a provider to prescribe a certain treatment. If a con-
sumer is familiar with a provider's financial incentives, he or
she can ask questions and be assured that a certain type of
treatment is the best option, and is not prescribed so that the
provider can stay under the monthly capitation ceiling. Thus,
the consumer is empowered against the HMO to ensure that he
its, so the patients did not realize that they might need more care" Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Other states passing laws affecting gag rules include: Colorado, California,
Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. Id.
159. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-c(2) (McKinney 1997). Section 4 specifically
states that no health care plan may:
[P]rohibit or restrict any health care provider from disclosing to any sub-
scriber, enrollee, patient, designated representative or... prospective enrollee
... any information that such provider deems appropriate regarding: (a) a con-
dition or a course of treatment with an enrollee including the availability of
other therapies, consultations, or tests; or (b) the provisions, terms, or require-
ments of the health care plan's products as they relate to the enrollee, where
applicable.
Id.
160. Pear, supra note 154, at A12.
161. Id. Maureen O'Haren, an HMO lobbyist, stated that she agreed with prohibi-
tions on gag clauses regarding treatment, but warned that doctors may not act in good
faith. "What [doctors] really want is to be able to disparage some health plans and en-
courage their patients to join other plans that pay the doctors more. Id.
162. See Pear, supra note 154, at A12.
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or she is getting the best quality of care. By requiring the disclo-
sure of a plan's "products,"163 the HCCPA gives the consumer
power beyond the standard gag clause prohibition. It gives the
patient an insight into the motivations concerning a prescribed
treatment, and allows the patient to ensure that the main in-
ducement is the patient's best interests.
Another complaint that providers often voice involves the
provision of emergency services. In a significant number of in-
stances, MCOs refuse to pay for emergency services, for varying
reasons. First, MCOs may contend that the medical condition
was not an "emergency."164 In order to deter patients from using
the emergency room for primary care,'165 MCOs often include a
strict definition of "emergency" in the health care plan. If the
patient does not meet the MCO's definition, payment for ser-
vices are denied.166
Likewise, MCOs often require preauthorization of proce-
dures in emergency situations, mandating that the physician
call a managed care representative to obtain approval before un-
dergoing certain tests or treatment procedures. 167 Finally, the
MCO often denies emergency services if they are not adminis-
tered by a network provider. 68 In this sense, MCOs could be as-
sured that they would only have to pay discounted rates negoti-
ated with contracting physicians.
However, the limitations of MCOs in emergency situations
have received strong criticism because of the grave and often
life-threatening scenarios that accompany emergency care.169 In
order to ensure payment of emergency services, many states
163. A "managed care product" is defined as a "contract which requires that all
medical or other health care services covered under the contract, other than emergency
care services, be provided by, or pursuant to a referral from, a designated health care
provider chosen by the subscriber." N.Y. INS. LAw § 4324(12)(e) (McKinney 1997).
164. See Christopher J. Young, Comment, Emergency! Says Who? Analysis of the Le-
gal Issues Concerning Managed Care and Emergency Medical Services, 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL.Y 553, 553-54 (1997).
165. See Vicki A. Baldassano, MCOs, Emergency Room Doctors at Odds over Cover-
age of Urgent Care, 4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1545, 1546 (Oct. 12, 1995).
166. Prudential Insurance provides coverage only for "true emergencies." A "true
emergency" is defined as a "condition where failure to get immediate care would put the
person's life in danger or pose a threat to bodily functions." Id. at 1546.
167. See Young, supra note 164, at 553-54.
168. Id.
169. See Charles Clark, Emergency Medicine, 6 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 3, 4 (1996).
See generally E.B. Boyd, Emergency Care Can Be Costly: Managed Care Plans Manage to
Have E.R. Bill Sent to Subscriber, PrrT. POST-GAZEPTE, Mar. 11, 1996, at A7; Robert
Pear, HMOs Refusing Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert: 2 Missions in Conflict, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1995, § 1, at 1.
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have adopted the "prudent layperson's standard."170
The prudent layperson's standard requires MCOs to pay for
emergency services if the medical condition is so sudden or se-
vere that a "prudent layperson" would recognize it as a serious
health threat requiring medical attention.17' New York has in-
cluded the standard in the HCCPA, defining "emergency condi-
tion" as existing if "a prudent layperson, possessing an average
knowledge of medicine and health," could realize that the in-
jured person is in "serious jeopardy" or is at risk of "serious im-
pairment" or "disfigurement." 72
Under this provision, an HMO must pay for tests if an en-
rollee enters the emergency room complaining of chest pains
and the physician reasonably believes that he or she is exper-
iencing a heart attack, even if the enrollee was actually only
suffering from indigestion. On the other extreme, an HMO
would not be required to pay for a magnetic resonance imaging
test for an enrollee who enters the emergency room with an eas-
ily detectable twisted ankle.
By imposing the prudent layperson standard, the HCCPA
removes the ability of the MCO to develop its own strict defini-
tion of emergency care. 7 3 Instead, a more objective definition is
adopted that allows for more reasonable errors in judgment.
Although some MCOs support the prudent layperson stan-
dard, others fear that the courts will interpret the standard
broadly, thereby effectively eliminating the ability of the MCO
to deny frivolous expenses. 174 The MCO's fears may not be un-
170. Consumers at Risk-July, supra note 10 (spot:access:protectionl:access to and
coverage of emergency treatment). Arkansas, California, Georgia, Virginia and Maryland
enacted and New York proposed the "prudent layperson's standard." Id.
171. See Baldassano, supra note 165, at 1546.
172. N.Y. INs. LAw § 3221(k)(4)(B) (McKinney 1997). The HCCPA specifically states
that an "emergency condition7 is:
A medical or behavioral condition, the onset of which is sudden, that manifests
itself by symptoms of sufficient severity, including severe pain, that a prudent
layperson, possessing an average knowledge of medicine and health, could rea-
sonably expect the absence of immediate medical attention to result in (i) plac-
ing the health of the person afflicted with such condition in serious jeopardy,
or in the case of a behavioral condition placing the health of such person or
others in serious jeopardy, or (ii) serious impairment to such person's bodily
functions; (iii) serious dysfumction of any bodily organ or part of such person;
or (iv) serious disfigurement of such person.
Id.
173. See Young, supra note 164, at 565.
174. See Baldassano, supra note 165, at 1546. According to Susan VanDevanter
Brennan, an ER nurse in Fairfax County, Virginia, "It may be difficult for consumers to
understand that in the health care of the 1990s, the goal is to provide appropriate medi-
cal care and limit hospitalization and cut expenses. It's not appropriate to run a CAT
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founded. Although the prudent layperson standard imposes
some objectivity in deciding what requires emergency care, it
leaves a gray area when determining exactly what an "emer-
gency condition" is. The HCCPA attempts to narrow this defini-
tion by imposing the term "serious jeopardy," but there is no
guidance as to how this term should be construed. Ultimately,
the courts will be left to determine exactly what constitutes "se-
rious jeopardy" under the HCCPA. Most likely, the courts will
adopt a broad construction, depending upon the circumstances
of each case.
E. The HCCPA as a Balancing Act
When the HCCPA was enacted, the popular press lauded its
passage as an Act that will protect consumer interests.175 How-
ever, many consumer groups, including the New York State
Health Care Campaign, Gay Men's Health Crisis Center and
Citizen's Action of New York, refused to support the bill, claim-
ing that New York omitted several important measures essential
to creating a strong consumer rights bill. 7 6
scan for every headache" Clark, supra note 169, at 3.
175. See Dena Bunis, Sweeping Changes for Health Care: What it Means to You,
NEWSDAY, July 14, 1996, at A6.
176. These groups cited defects in the appeals process and failure to obtain a point-
of-service (POS) option. See New New York Managed Care, supra note 113. "Any willing
provider" provisions require MCOs to accept any provider who is willing to follow all
contract terms of the plan. These provisions deter MCOs from creating elite networks
through selective contracting. However, after much debate, New York chose not to in-
clude the standard. Opponents to "any willing provider" provisions argue that the provi-
sions impede the MCO's ability to assure high-quality care, and forces them to accept
practitioners that do not provide the best services:
[It] defeats the entire concept of managed care. [MCOs] currently contract with
only the number of physicians needed to serve their patients. By offering phy-
sicians an increased patient volume and a set income, HMOs are able to nego-
tiate lower rates. Requiring HMOs to allow any qualified physician to join the
plan would drive up operating costs and reduce the HMO's bargaining
power .... Cost savings generated by HMOs would be lost, and higher premi-
ums would result.
Platt & Stream, supra note 8, at 499. Some individuals, on the other hand, view "any
willing provider" provisions as "[tlhe primary legislative protection for physicians in the
managed care arena," and consider the inclusion of the provisions as a crucial factor.
Without the standard, some individuals argue that providers are left vulnerable to the
desires of the managed care network. See John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician
Credentialing into Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 200
(1996). For more discussion, see generally Karen A. Jordan, Managed Competition and
Limited Choice of Providers: Countering Negative Perceptions Through a Responsibility to
Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 Aiz. ST. L.J. 875, 915 (1995); Lois Snyder, Equi-
care: A Model for Quality Health Care and Consumer Choice in State Health System Re-
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The Health Care Consumer Protection Act, despite its popu-
lar title, is not a consumer rights bill; rather, it is a bipartisan
effort that compromises between competing interests. The
HCCPA's Memorandum in Support emphasized that the Act
sought to balance cost effective care with quality of care, while
seeking to "avoid undue regulatory burdens." 7'
Thus, although the New York legislature wanted to provide
statutory protections for consumers, it also did not want to in-
fringe upon managed care's ability to contain costs. New York
Insurance Committee chairman Pete Grannis stated that he felt
the enactment would empower people to make more informed
choices about managed care plans while "the competitive nature
of the market [would] push the managed care companies to be
better caregivers."178
The result is watered-down legislation. Health care analyst
Karen Ignagni observes:
[Because of the managed care backlash], the temptation for members of
Congress and state legislators is to produce measures that can lead to
governmental micro-management. [However,] mlany policymakers are
well aware that arbitrary mandates-twenty-four hours for this, thirty-
six for that-not only fail to allow for case by case variations, but per-
versely encourage just another form of cookbook medicine while absolv-
ing practitioners of any responsibility to keep health care accessible by
practicing as cost-effectively as possible. But under pressure from constit-
uents reacting to critics' charges, policymakers may be understandably
tempted to pass legislation now, call it consumer protection, and cope
with the consequences later.179
In fact, the HCCPA has been criticized for not being as con-
sumer-friendly as possible.180
Along with the absence of an "any willing provider" provi-
sion,181 the legislation continues to leave a large degree of con-
trol to the MCOs, causing the providers to remain in the uncom-
fortable position of acting as both an MCO agent and patient
advocate. Gatekeeping systems and financial incentives are not
significantly addressed in the Act, allowing the MCO to continue
controlling the actions of PCPs.
form, 5 ANNALs HEALTH L. 145, 162 (1996).
177. MMORA Ui IN SUPPORT, 1996 N.Y. LAws 705, 2637, 2641 (McKinney 1996).
178. Bunis, supra note 175, at A6.
179. See Karen Ignagni, Covering a Breaking Revolution: The Media and Managed
Care, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 26, 33.
180. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 176.
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In terms of liability, the legislation contains no prohibition
of "hold harmless" clauses, which would place the physician at
total risk in the event of a medical malpractice suit, while it si-
multaneously relieves the MCO from any accountability 8 2 Other
complaints are directed at the absence of third party, neutral
watchdogs to enforce the legislation. Although the bill requires
grievance procedures and outside referrals, the administration
of these provisions is left to the MCO, perhaps naively assuming
that the organizations will implement the measures in good
faith. Many consumer groups are not willing to give MCOs the
power to enforce the provisions, and argue that an outside
mechanism should be established to ensure that the MCOs are
in full compliance.
F. The Benefits of Managed Care Under a Free Market System
Despite the shortcomings of the HCCPA and other state
acts, legislators needed to stop short of complete regulation in
order to maintain the benefits of managed care. Regardless of
any criticisms, it is clear that managed care reduces health care
costs for providers and consumers. 8 3 Lower monthly premiums
reduce financial barriers to care for certain populations by cut-
ting copayments and deductibles. 8 4 MCOs can assemble teams
of doctors with various specialties, deploy information systems
to monitor quality and systematically assess providers within its
network.185 There is also a stronger effort to research emerging
medical techniques, which will reduce costs while providing
quality care. Finally, managed care actively encourages enroll-
ees to engage in preventative care and obtain routine medical
services.
As a result, not all states have chosen managed care regula-
tion as the answer to health care problems. In two referendum
votes from the November 1996 election, California voters de-
feated Propositions 214 and 216, which would have imposed
many of the measures contained in the HCCPA.186 Proposition
182. See Mark S. Reuben et al., Liability and Managed Care, 98 PEDIATRICS 792,
794 (1996).
183. One study found that spending increases in health care costs have slowed dra-
matically in the past five years. This decreased spending was found to largely be attribu-
table to the thriving economy and increased managed care enrollment. See Katherine R.
Levit et al., National Health Spending Trends in 1996, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at
35, 37.
184. See Issues, Reforms, and Trade-Offs, supra note 15, at 1324.
185. Id.
186. See David R. Olnos, Election '96: Experts Foresee More Efforts to Reform HMO
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214 prohibited the use of financial incentives and gag rules to
ration the use of medical facilities, 8 7 and Proposition 216 levied
taxes for health care mergers and other corporate restructuring
which make MCOs more formidable to individual consumers. 188
The defeat of these initiatives raises questions as to
whether the public believes that HMO regulation is the best
course of action to combat MCO intrusion. California is consid-
ered the most integrated MCO state in the country, with over
thirteen million enrollees.189 Studies show that Californians
have lower health care premiums and spend less per capita on
medical expenses. 190 While California counties pay between
4.02%-5.48%, where the national average is 5.92%.191
Increased efficiency has also created massive savings for
Californians. One large HMO, Kaiser Southern California, reor-
ganized several departments in its system by establishing a con-
tinuing care department that developed alternatives to hospital
Regulation; But Opponents Say Defeat of Propositions 214, 216 Indicates Consumers are
Satisfied with Managed Care, L-A- TmrEs, Nov. 7, 1996, at D4.
187. The text of Proposition 214:
Prohibits health care businesses from: discouraging health care profession-
als from informing patients or advocating for treatment; offering incentives for
withholding care; refusing services recommended by a licensed caregiver with-
out examination by the business's own professional.
Requires health care businesses to: make tax returns... information pub-
lic; disclose certain financial information to consumers including administrative
costs; establish criteria for authorizing or denying payment for care; provide
minimum safe and adequate staffing of health care facilities.
California Attorney General, Health Care, Consumer Protection: Initiative Statute, Nov.
15, 1996, <http:i/Vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/htmlIBP/214.htm> (spot:text of proposition) (on
file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
188. The text of Proposition 216:
Prohibits health care businesses from: discouraging health care profession-
als from informing patients/advocating for treatment; offering incentives for
withholding care; refusing services recommended by a licensed caregiver with-
out examination by the business's own professional; increasing changes without
filing required statement; conditioning coverage on arbitration agreement.
Requires health care businesses to: make tax returns public; establish cri-
teria written by licensed health care professionals for denying payment for
care; establish staffing standards for health care facilities.
Authorizes public/private enforcement actions.
Establishes nonprofit public corporation for consumer advocacy.
Accesses taxes for certain corporate structure changes.
California Attorney General, Health Care, Consumer Protection, Taxes on Corporate Re.
structuring: Initiative Statute, Nov. 15, 1996, <http://Vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/
216.htm> (spot:text of proposition) (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
189. Olmos, supra note 186, at D4.
190. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Managed Competition and California's
Health Care Economy, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 39, 43 (1996).
191. Id.
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stays and created other coordination strategies that caused hos-
pital inpatient stays to drop, saving over $6.3 million per year.192
Because managed care does present benefits to the health
care industry (as illustrated by California), not all consumers
are willing to impose state regulations that have the potential
effect of curbing health care savings and efficiency. Instead, they
are willing to put their faith in the free market system.
New York legislators were also mindful of the benefits of
managed care when drafting the HCCPA. Although Governor
Pataki recognized consumer fears regarding managed care, he
wanted to create a bill that did not weigh too heavily in favor of
consumer advocates. Rather, he wanted to strike a proper bal-
ance between consumer concerns and managed care.193
G. Towards a Model of Market Competition?
The need to balance consumer concerns with managed care
occurs in a context of intense market competition. With the
United States spending billions of dollars in health care, consti-
tuting 13.7% of the gross domestic product, 194 numerous actors
have sought to become involved in the managed care industry.
Obviously, this trend increases competition between managed
care entities. With MCOs fighting to gain a significant number
of enrollees, the public may be placed in a position to compare
various plans and negotiate the best deal. Ultimately, increased
competition in the marketplace will deter MCOs from offering
too few services, or denying treatment as a regular procedure.195
Competition will ensure that patients will get at least a mini-
mal amount of services from their MCO.196
192. Id. at 48.
193. See MEMORANDubi IN SUPPORT, supra note 177.
194. Pollock & Rice, supra note 62, at 111.
195. Professor Alain Enthoven and Sara Singer extol the benefits of market forces
in the health care field:
Market forces can motivate continuing innovation to improve value-including
improving quality, customer service, and satisfaction and lowering cost. Market
forces also cater to various tastes and preferences and adjust to changing con-
ditions. Government actions tend to be more rigid. Market forces create ac-
countability, investment in information technology, elimination of unwanted
variation in medical practice patterns, coordinated care... [In sum,] markets
can allocate resources efficiently by bringing marginal benefits and costs into
approximate equality.
Alain Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in Regulating Managed
Care, H.ALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26.
196. See Moran, supra note 6, at 14-15.
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However, there are instances of market failure. In an at-
tempt to curb market competition, many MCOs are merging to
create large, dominant companies. 197 The consolidation of MCOs
is an attempt to gain economies of scale and secure greater ne-
gotiating clout when establishing rate schedules. Yet the con-
stant push towards creating larger organizations may dilute the
consumer's advantage in market competition. This is particu-
larly true for small employers, who are increasingly switching
from traditional indemnity plans to managed care. 198 Whereas
large corporations are able to negotiate decent fees because of
the large number of enrollees they represent, small employers
and the uninsured or underinsured do not possess this benefit.
In this respect, the use of purchasing cooperatives may present
the best option.199
Purchasing cooperatives (Cooperatives) are organized groups
of health care consumers who seek to act collectively in order to
gain economies of scale with the MCO and other health care en-
tities. 200 A Cooperative may be formed by private actors, or by
government.20' Privately, it is estimated that over one hundred
and fifty Cooperatives exist, formed by various employer and
small business coalitions.20 2 Groups such as the Pacific Business
197. Doctor Victor R. Fuchs observes that "[hiardly a week goes by without hearing
or reading about a major merger or takeover... ." Fuchs speculates that one reason for
mergers is to create organizations which are "too big to fail .... If a large health organ-
ization gains a major share of a particular health care market, the local or state govern-
ment may feel that failure of that organization would be very disruptive to the health of
the community." Victor R. Fuchs, Managed Care and Merger Mania, 277 JAMA 920, 920-
21 (Mar. 19, 1997). The recent rash of merging MCOs is illustrated in Buffalo, New York
with the consolidation of three area MCOs: Independent Health, Health Care Plan and
Health Services Corp. of Central New York. The new, massive HMO, to be named Inde-
pendent Health Care Plan, is expected to represent approximately 693,000 enrollees. Al-
ternatively, such consolidation also prompts health care providers to consolidate. In Buf-
falo, three hospitals (Buffalo General, Millard Fillmore, and Children's Hospital) signed
a letter of intent to merge. In addition, the areas seven Catholic hospitals have an-
nounced plans to integrate. See Henry Davis, Medical Merger, BUFF. NEWS, June 4, 1997,
at Al.
198. Firms with fewer than fifty workers have dropped conventional insurance
plans from 78% to 31% between 1993 and 1995. See Jenson, supra note 4, at 127.
199. Purchasing Cooperatives were an essential component of President Clinton's
failed 1993 Health Care Reform proposal. The proposal was based on the model of "man-
aged competition," that is, a health care system influenced by market forces but pro-
tected by purchasing cooperatives. Managed competition was first developed and pro-
posed by the Jackson Hole group led by Alain Enthoven. For more discussion on
managed competition, see Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed
Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24, 26.
200. Id. at 35.
201. See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 195, at 31.
202. See Steven Findlay & Salisbury Adams, The Coalition Movement Grows up;
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Group on Health Care serve to increase the negotiating clout of
small businessmen.2 3 However, these groups may not be willing
to accept high-risk populations like Medicare/Medicaid recipi-
ents.204 In a government cooperative, the government maintains
substantial negotiating clout.20 5 Total expenditures for Medicare/
Medicaid for public employees and veterans constitute one-third
of overall health care spending.20 6 With government aggregating
marginal populations of poor, elderly and chronically ill persons,
such groups may not be left out of the health care system.
Cooperatives offer additional benefits. Along with negotiat-
ing better cost schedules and rates, Cooperatives can be a fun-
damental source of information for the consumer by acting as an
advocate for its enrollees and ensuring that MCOs provide qual-
ity services. Cooperatives can act as lobbyists in state and fed-
eral government to represent consumer interests when legisla-
tion is considered. Along with MCOs, Cooperatives can subsidize
research grants and educational programs to ensure advance-
ment of the health care system. Best of all, these benefits can
accrue without massive state or federal intervention. The mar-
ket can continue to operate uninhibited. The only difference is
that consumers will possess a much larger voice, and MCOs will
be more inclined to listen.207
In addition to Cooperatives, some analysts feel that consum-
ers need to educate themselves so that they can act as knowl-
edgeable and effective advocates. 208 As alluded to throughout
this Comment, consumers are at a comparative disadvantage be-
Employer Coalitions and Health Purchasing Cooperatives, 14 Bus. & HEALTH 16 (1996).
The Florida legislature implemented a mini-version of managed competition, creating
eleven "Community Health Purchasing Alliances" (known as "chippas"), and California
has allowed co-ops to exist since 1993. See Michael Buettner, Two Years Old, Insurance
Pools Generally Successful, TAMPA BAY Bus. J., July 12, 1996, at 17. Over 17,500 busi-
nesses are enrolled in chippas, representing over 80,000 individuals. Thus far, busi-
nesses are reporting that they are saving "millions." Id. Private HPCs are being devel-
oped in at least eight other states, including Iowa, Illinois, Montana, Oregon and Texas.
See Rick Curtis & Kevin Haugh, Small-Employer Co-ops Pick Up Speed, 14 Bus. &
HEALTH 29 (1996).
203. See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 195, at 26.
204. In forming purchasing cooperatives, Alain Enthoven recognizes that small busi-
nesses are limited in resources and cannot carry the burden of at-risk populations. In
this respect, Enthoven believes that government action should help in establishing coop-
eratives. See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 195, at 31.
205. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
206. Enthoven & Singer, supra note 195, at 31.
207. For further discussion regarding the potential benefits of purchasing coopera-
tive see Enthoven & Singer, supra note 195.
208. See Marc Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: The Need for Or-
ganized Consumers, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 110.
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cause of their lack of specialized knowledge in the health care
field. Similar to the function of a Cooperative, organized con-
sumer groups will protect consumer interests within a market-
place environment. These groups will act as advocates and will
monitor governmental and private health care practices. 20 9 It is
important, however, to ensure that these organizations are inde-
pendent of MCOs. There must be no mechanism by which an
MCO can influence a consumer organization's activities. Thus,
the organization must be funded independently.210 If successful,
consumer organizations and/or Cooperatives may curb many of
the potential abuses of managed care. The presence of large rep-
resentative organizations will force MCOs to be more responsive
to consumer needs.
CONCLUSION
Managed Care is like the little girl with a curl-when it's good it's
very, very good, but when it's bad, it's horrid.211
Health care's current task is to strike a balance between
regulating managed care and allowing it to operate in a free
market system. Legislators are often caught in the middle. Al-
though "high drama" stories run rampant in the popular press
and general public, legislators are well aware that state regula-
tion will impede the progress accomplished by MCOs. 212 As a re-
sult, state legislatures have passed watered-down bills to satisfy
consumer fears. These enactments are lauded as protections
against corporate medicine. In reality, they are token gestures
designed to calm the current backlash while MCOs continue to
operate in a marketplace environment. The HCCPA is no excep-
tion. Despite the HCCPA's comprehensiveness, it does not ad-
dress the core concepts of managed care, such as capitation or
209. Id. at 112.
210. Funding for a consumer organization may be raised through a variety of
means:
Checkoff devices on enrollment forms could be implemented by which millions
of managed care enrollees would have the option of adding one dollar or less to
support consumer organizations... [floundations could endow watchdog orga-
nizations .... Courts could direct funds from class-action or punitive damage
awards involving managed care organizations to qualifying consumer organiza-
tions ... Government agencies could fund consumer intervenors in regulatory
and even legislative proceedings.
Zellman, supra note 7, at 165-66.
211. Clark, supra note 169, at 9 (quoting Stan Dorn, Health Director of the Chil-
dren's Defense Fund).
212. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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the gatekeeper system. In the long run, the measures imposed
by the HCCPA will not pose a significant threat to managed
care. Regardless of public sentiment in the wake of managed
care backlash, the legislators' hesitancy in enacting strict con-
sumer protection measures will probably prove beneficial. The
health care system works best in a free market environment.
Growing competition will provide consumers greater choice
among plans, and assure at least a minimal amount of ser-
vices. 213 The proliferation of Cooperatives and consumer organi-
zations will provide further protection for the patient. The ulti-
mate effect is an efficient, cost-effective system which contains
mechanisms that assure coverage for small businessmen, the
elderly, poor and chronically ill. In this respect, the health care
system is able to progress into the twenty-first century in rela-
tively good condition.
213. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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